This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in the procurement process. Limited liability causes¯rms in a bad¯nancial situation to bid more aggressively than good¯rms in the procurement auction. Therefore, it is likely that the winning¯rm is a¯rm in¯nancial di±culties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzes di®erent regulatory practices to face this problem with a special emphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We show that the use of surety bonds reduces and sometimes eliminates the problem of abnormally low tenders. However, we¯nd that under a natural assumption the US practice of requiring that surety bonds cover over a 100% of the contract price is excessive, providing overinsurance to the problem of abnormally low tenders.
Introduction
In a procurement process the administration or private sponsor sometimes receive a very low bid. Is this low price for the realization of a project always good news for the sponsor? Not necessarily. Although the low bid might be due to low costs of the¯rm or estimation mistakes made by the¯rm which the¯rm (and not the sponsor) will have to bear, very often this low bid is related to the strategic behavior of the¯rm during the auction. This strategic behavior of the¯rms when bidding can be due to several factors. Some¯rms bid very aggressively because they expect to renegotiate the contract later on when it will be very costly for the sponsor to replace the incumbent¯rm (which causes cost overruns). Aggressive bids might also be due tō rms in a bad¯nancial state struggling for survival by taking a risky strategy since their owners and managers are protected by bankruptcy laws. To award the project to an insolvent¯rm with a high probability of bankruptcy is problematic since bankruptcy is very costly for the sponsor: bankruptcy implies huge delays in the completion of the project, litigation costs, the cost of the new procurement process, etc. We we will use the term abnormally low tenders (ALTs) exclusively for this latter phenomenon. This paper is the¯rst (to our knowledge) to model this gambling for resurrection in the procurement process, and to analyze some of the regulatory measures proposed to eliminate it. We do not study cost overruns, which have been modeled e.g. by Lewis (1986) , Arvan and Leite (1990) and Ganuza (2000) .
Abnormally low tenders are an important problem especially in the construction industry in which it is easy to close and reopen a business because everything can be subcontracted. For small or medium sized procurement projects the problem is aggravated because the market of potential constructors is big and little is known about each individual constructor. In the US during 1990-1997 more than 80000 contractors went bankrupt leaving un¯nished private and public construction projects with liabilities exceeding $21 billion. 1 According to the Associated General Contractors of America about one-half of today's construction¯rms will be out of business 1 Dun & Bradstreet Business Failure Record. in six years. In Europe, the situation is not any better. In 1997 the European Union studied how to improve the competitiveness of the European construction industry and found that abnormally low tenders were one of the main problems, and therefore became a priority issue. 2 The¯rst objective of the paper is to analyze the problem of abnormally low tenders from a theoretical point of view. In order to do so, we develop a simple model in which¯rms with identical costs but di®erent¯nancial positions compete in a second-price auction for a procurement project.
The project has some uncertainty with respect to its costs. The attitude towards this uncertainty depends on each¯rm's¯nancial position. Firms are protected by limited liability (bankruptcy laws). Therefore, the potential losses of¯rms with a good¯nancial status are bigger than that of rms with a bad¯nancial status, since some of the losses are not realized due to limited liability.
Hence,¯rms in bad¯nancial shape will behave as if they were risk loving and therefore bid more aggressively than¯rms in good shape. 3 Consequently, it is very likely that a¯rm in a bad¯nancial position will win the auction and bankruptcy is probable. From the point of view of the sponsor the auction fails to select the best bidder:¯rms are identical except for their¯nancial status and the sponsor would like to select a¯rm with a low probability of bankruptcy.
The second objective of the paper is to evaluate some regulatory policies that di®erent countries have developed to mitigate the problem of abnormally low tenders. We mainly study the so-called surety bonds, a system that is used in the US, Canada and Japan and is seriously considered by the European Community, given its relative success compared to the current European regulation. Surety bonds work as follows: the sponsor requires from each bidder a surety bond.
The surety bond is an instrument under which the surety company guarantees to the sponsor that the constructor will perform the procurement contract. The bond speci¯es the obligations of the contractor, namely to¯nish the project at the bid price and to pay the subcontractors. In case of contractor's failure, both the contractor and the surety company are liable. The surety therefore helps the contractor to¯nish the construction project in case of di±culties. If this is too costly, the surety compensates the sponsor for the amount speci¯ed in the bond. In practice, sureties are regulated 4 and required to have su±cient capital reserves to back the bonds they issue. Since sureties are responsible for completing the contract, they have strong incentives to screen potential constructors' technical ability and¯nancial status. We¯rst analyze surety bonds from a theoretical point of view, showing that its introduction reduces the problem of abnormally low tenders. Then we also theoretically analyze the US practice of requiring a surety bond equal to a 100% of the contract price. We¯nd that the US practice is not optimal. The main reason is that the US practice does not link the surety bond to the uncertainty associated with the project but to its expected cost. Usually this implies overinsurance for the sponsor.
Finally we discuss two other regulatory instruments sometimes proposed and used to control abnormally low tenders: letters of credit and an endogenous rule to detect and exclude abnormally low bids from the auction (e.g. if it di®ers by more than 10% or 15% from the average of the tenders). We argue that both regulatory practices are inferior to the use of surety bonds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model and show why abnormally low tenders occur. In section 3 we introduce and analyze surety bonds, including the US requirement that the surety bond equals the contract price. We show this is excessive. Section 4 discusses letters of credits and the e®ects of an endogenous rule to detect abnormally low bids. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to a technical appendix.
The Model
Consider a risk neutral administration or sponsor who plans to undertake a public construction project of value V , where V is large enough so that it is always optimal to build the project.
There are N risk neutral potential constructors in the market. All constructors have the same cost structure. For each potential constructor the cost of the project is C P = c + s, where s is a random shock which is uniformly distributed, s s U [¡k; k]; with c > k. 5 Constructors di®er in their initial¯nancial status A i ; which is the value of the¯rm in case the project is not realized by the¯rm. A i is private information of¯rm i. 6 Construction¯rms have limited liability, i.e. if A i < 0 they can avoid losses by closing down. Firm i will close down if A i < 0 and¯rm i is not awarded the project or if¯rm i is awarded the project and A i plus the net pro¯ts from undertaking the project fall below 0 during the construction process. To be more precise, thē nancial value of the¯rm after the project is realized (¦ i ) is de¯ned as follows:
where P is the procurement price and x i 2 f0; 1g indicates to whom the project is assigned.
x i = 1 if and only if¯rm i gets the project. We assume that there exists at least one¯rm with A i > k; 7 and that the¯nancial status of the rest of the¯rms is distributed according to an arbitrary distribution function F (¢).
The sponsor organizes a second price auction to procure the project. Therefore the¯rm with the lowest bid is awarded the project at the price of the second lowest bid. 8 During the construction process the unknown cost parameter s is realized and the¯rm either¯nishes the project or declares bankruptcy. As we said in the Introduction, bankruptcy implies important costs to the sponsor arising from the huge delays in the completion of the project, litigation costs, 5 Notice that if c < k the total cost might turn out to be negative for some realizations of the shock. 6 In practice, the sponsor is able to obtain some information on the the¯nancial situation of the¯rm. However,a public sponsor (an administration) is usually restricted to the use of hard and veri¯able information such as whether the¯rm is on current payment of social security and other liabilities like loans, and is not specialized in the screening of¯rms. A private sponsor does not have the former restriction but it also lacks the screening ability to clearly identify the¯nancial situation of each¯rm. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the true value of A i is private information of¯rm i to some extend. 7 We make this assumption in order to avoid the uninteresting case in which bankruptcy is due to the fact that there is no solvent¯rm. In Corollary 1 it is shown that¯rms with A i > k cannot go bankrupt during the construction process. 8 The second price auction works as follows:¯rms present their bids, the¯rm with the lowest bid wins the auction at a price equal to the second lowest bid. The advantage of this auction is that it is a dominant strategy for thē rms to bid the opportunity cost of building the project, independently of the features of the environment, such as the number of bidders, the distribution of the¯nancial values of¯rms, etc. This property makes the analytical treatment of the paper a lot easier. At the same time we think that the main intuitions of the paper do not rely on the particular characteristics of the second price auction and can be extended to any kind of standard auction mechanism (as¯rst price auction, English auction). For a good survey of the literature on auction theory, see Klemperer (1999) . the cost of the new procurement process, etc. We denote these cost by C B , with C B > 0. We assume that when the¯rm declares bankruptcy the sponsor has to bear the realized cost of the project plus this bankruptcy cost minus the liquidation value of the¯rm A L = max fA i ; 0g. When the¯rm declares bankruptcy it cannot comply with the procurement contract and the sponsor can apropriate the¯rm's asset, if any. 9 Thus, the utility of the sponsor is
We now summarize the timing of the model:
1. Nature chooses the¯nancial value A i of each¯rm.
2. The sponsor announces the procurement process. Firms present their bids.
3. The project is awarded to the¯rm with the lowest bid at a price equal to the second lowest bid. This¯rm starts constructing the project. The unknown cost parameter s is realized.
If A ¤ + P ¡ c ¡ s > 0, the¯rm¯nishes the project. Otherwise it declares bankruptcy and the cost of¯nishing the project for the sponsor is c + s + C B ¡ A L .
Sponsor and¯rms get their payo®s.
Given that in the model all constructors have the same cost function, the e±ciency of the winning¯rm is not an issue. The main issue is to minimize both the procurement price and the probability of bankruptcy. In the next subsection we show that a simple auction mechanism, as the standard second price auction, does not optimally balance these two objectives.
Abnormally low tenders
Under the standard second price auction the procurement process is similar to Bertrand competition among heterogeneous¯rms. Hence, the equilibrium bid of each¯rm i is the minimum 9 Sometimes the sponsor might prefer to help the¯rm who won the contract to¯nish the project, in order to avoid the bankruptcy process and its costs for the sponsor (delays, litigation costs). Allowing for this possibility does not alter our results (summarized in Porposition 1), which only require that transaction (bankruptcy) costs are positive.
price P ¤ i for which¯rm i is willing to accept the project, de¯ned by:
where Ef¦ i (x i = 1; P ¤ i )g denotes the expected value of¯rm i when it is awarded the project.
Firm i wins the second price auction if and only if P ¤ i = minfP ¤ 1 ; : : : ; P ¤ i ; : : : ; P ¤ N g; and will be paid P = minfP ¤ 1 ; : : : ; P ¤ i¡1 ; P ¤ i+1 ; : : : ; P ¤ N g. Lemma 1 characterizes the equilibrium bid function.
Lemma 1
The equilibrium bid is Given corollary 1 and abusing terminology we will refer to all¯rms with A i¸k as`solvent' and all¯rms with A i < k who might go bankrupt as`insolvent'. Any insolvent¯rm with A i 2 (¡k; k)
will bid more aggressively than solvent¯rms with A i¸k . Limited liability makes insolvent¯rms behave as if they were risk loving. To illustrate this argument, assume that the procurement price is c. The expected earnings of a solvent¯rm are equal to minus the expected unknown cost, namely 0. However, the expected earnings of an insolvent¯rm are positive, because any realization of the shock s such that s > A i is equivalent to s = A i for the insolvent¯rm, since the insolvent¯rm will declare bankruptcy in all these cases. Therefore, the winning¯rm is not going to be solvent unless all¯rms are solvent. Hence, bankruptcy is likely to occur.
This phenomenon that¯rms bid below costs is better known as abnormally low tenders. The main worry of the public administration or sponsor concerning abnormally low tenders is that when they occur, the probability of bankruptcy is high. Our model provides the argument why this happens:¯rms in a bad¯nancial shape gamble for resurrection; given that they have little to loose they bid very aggressively in the hope of a good realization of the shock.
From the sponsor's point of view, there exist two countervailing e®ects. On the one hand, aggressive bidding is good because it reduces the price the sponsor has to pay. On the other hand, aggressive bidding increases the probability of bankruptcy of the winning¯rm. Proposition 1 states that this second e®ect dominates, and that the second price auction therefore fails to select the appropriate¯rm from the sponsor's point of view.
Proposition 1
The second price auction awards the contract to an insolvent¯rm with A i 2 (¡k; k) (provided there is some), and the sponsor would be better o® by awarding it to a solvent rm at its bid price c.
In other words, the sponsor faces an adverse selection problem when he awards the project using a simple auction mechanism. Moreover, this problem might increase with¯ercer competition.
If there are N¯rms (one of which is solvent by assumption) the probability that the winning¯rm belongs to A i 2 (¡k; k) and therefore might go bust is de¯ned by 10
which increases in the number of¯rms N . This does not allow us to conclude that increasing competition is bad in reality, because we make the strong assumption in our model that costs are symmetric. With asymmetric costs increasing the number of¯rms might mean that a more e±cient¯rm enters the market.
To summarize, the auction does not select the adequate¯rm. The sponsor therefore has to look for some instruments to reduce abnormally low tenders. In the next section we analyze the surety bonds system.
Surety Bonds
In various countries there exist several regulatory measures to deal with the problem of abnormal low tenders. In this section we discuss one of them: the requirement that the winninḡ rm of a procurement process posts a surety bond.
Surety bonds were¯rst introduced in the US in 1894 by the Heard Act in a time period when public construction work began to be important. In the late 19th century, anybody could qualify as a constructor: no speci¯c education nor experience was required and start-up costs were very low. As a result, the construction sector was very big with many insolvent construction¯rms.
The failure rates were high, and it was discovered that most¯rms that went bankrupt during the construction of a public project had been close to bankruptcy before winning the contract. To protect tax payers, the congress passed the Heard Act authorizing (requiring) the use of surety bonds on public construction projects. The Heard Act was replaced by the Miller's Act in 1935.
The Miller Act requires the contractor to provide for surety bonds for all Federal construction contracts over $100.000. 11 A surety bond is a guarantee in which the surety company guarantees that the contractor will perform the obligation stated in the bond. 12 We focus our analysis on 'performance bonds'. 13 A performance bond guarantees the sponsor that the contractor will 11 Statutes in all¯fty states and the District of Columbia require performance and payment bonds for state government contracts. These state statues often are called "Little Miller Acts" because many of them are modeled after the federal Miller Act.
12 See http://www.sio.org/ (Surety Information O±ce), and Donohue and Thomas (1996) for a thorough explanation on surety bonds. 13 Besides the performace bonds there are two other types of bonds: (i) bid bonds that assure the sponsor that the bidder will honor its bid and will sign all contract documents if awarded the contract. The bid bond is often ten to twenty percent of the bid amount; (ii) the payment bond that protects subcontractors and suppliers against default complete the contract according to its terms including price and time. If the contractor defaults, the sponsor may call upon the surety to complete the contract, or pay the bond. Performance bonds give the sureties three options: completing the contract itself (taking up the contract); selecting a new contractor to contract directly with the sponsor; or allowing the sponsor to complete the work with the surety paying the costs (up to the amount established in the surety bond). In the US it is common practice that the required performance bond is usually one hundred percent of the contract price.
A contractor (a¯rm competing in a procurement process) can meet surety bonds requirements for federal contracts in one of two ways. One way are surety bonds issued by an individual surety who pledges certain de¯ned types of acceptable assets (such as cash, readily marketable assets, or irrevocable letters of credit from a federally insured¯nancial institution) in the required amounts to support the bonds. However, by far the most common means of satisfying federal bonding requirements is by a bond issued by an approved corporate surety. The Department of the Treasury maintains a list of corporate sureties approved to issue bonds for federal projects, Treasury Department Circular 570. When approving corporate sureties, Treasury makes a determination as to the¯nancial strength of the surety (by requiring them enough capital to meet their bonding liabilities), and sets an underwriting limit, commonly called a bonding limit.
All sureties evaluate the contractor and the contractor's work to decide whether the surety will bond that contractor. Since the surety guarantees the contractor's performance, the surety has strong incentives to decide whether the contractor has the ability and resources to perform.
A surety's means of evaluating a contractor to decide if it will issue bonds is the underwriting process. During this process, the surety requires¯nancial and technical statement from the¯rms and establishes the price of the bond accordingly. Potential customers usually have to provide the surety with their audited¯scal year-end statement including the balance sheet showing their net worth and an income and cash°ow statement. The surety also wants to see their organizational by the primer contractor. The payment bond often guarantees less than the total amount of the prime contract. In this paper we assume that the contract is always entered at the bid price and there are no subcontractors. Therefore, surety bonds in our model focus on performance bonds. chart with key personnel, business plan, growth and pro¯t objectives, a list of completed jobs in the past and letters of recommendation.
Finally, surety bond premiums (the price contractors have to pay for the surety bond) usually are priced as a percentage of the size of the surety bond issued. A typical contractor may pay a bond premium between one per cent and¯ve percent of the size of the bond. The largest, most nancially secure contractors in the US would pay the lowest bond premium.
Modelling surety bonds
We now introduce surety bonds in our framework. Assume that the sponsor requires a surety bond of size L from the winning¯rm. Each¯rm will have to go to a surety company to apply for the bond covering its bid. Surety companies screen¯rms and learn A i . On account of their screening process, sureties can choose a di®erent interest rate (premium or fee) r i for each¯rm.
If the surety bond of size L is granted, sureties have to freeze su±cient funds of their own to back it up. Alternatively, the surety company could invest L in a riskless asset at interest rate r 0 .
Granting the surety bond is risky since¯rms might not be able to pay the surety fee or to¯nish the project on their own. Should this happen, the surety has to intervene; it either helps the¯rm to¯nish the project or it will loose L if the cost for¯nishing the project exceeds L. If the¯rm's pro¯ts are positive but fall short of the surety fee, the surety company will con¯scate the pro¯ts.
We assume that surety companies are perfectly competitive, hence they make zero pro¯t. Finally, with the introduction of a surety bond the utility of the sponsor is
The timing when a surety bond is required goes as follows:
1. The sponsor procures a project, requiring a surety bond of size L.
2. Firms negotiate with the surety companies a fee for the required surety bond. Firms bid.
The¯rm with the lowest bid is awarded the project at the second lowest price. 14 14 Notice that the contract between the surety company and the¯rm does not include the bid price of the latter.
3. The winning¯rm signs the contract with the surety company, pays the fee, and posts the surety bond while getting paid by the sponsor. 15 4. The¯rm starts constructing the project and¯nds out the true costs.
5. The¯rm either¯nishes the project, is assisted by the surety company or goes bankrupt, in which case the surety company pays the surety bond L.
We now derive the equilibrium bids of the¯rm and the interest rate of the bond r i for each type of¯rm, for a given surety bond of size L and a given¯nancial value of the¯rm A i . We derive these variables using the two zero pro¯t conditions mentioned above:
1. As the procurement mechanism is a second price auction, the equilibrium bid has to leave the¯rm indi®erent between winning or not winning the project:
2. Given perfect competition among surety companies, the surety has to be indi®erent between issuing the surety bond or investing L in a riskless asset: 16
where Ef¦ S (P ¤ i ; L; r i )g denotes the expected pro¯t of the surety company when it sells a surety bond. Lemma 2 and the corollary 2 characterize the equilibrium interest rate.
Lemma 2
The fees of the surety company are:
However, this is not important because the surety company can infer the bid strategy of the¯rm, since it has perfect information about the¯rm. 15 The exact timing in which the payments are made is not relevant, as long as the contracts between the sponsor and the¯rm, and between the surety company and the¯rm, are signed before the unknown cost is realized. 16 We assume that surety companies take the worst case scenario as their reference point, i.e. they set interest rates in such a way that they get zero pro¯ts should the bid price turn out to be the true procurement price. This assumption is mainly made for the sake of simplicity. Using the expected procurement price in the zero pro¯t condition would make the problem impossible to handle analytically (lack of montonicity).
r(A
The surety's interest rate r i is 1. a non-increasing function of¯rms'¯nancial status A i .
2. a non-increasing function of the size L of the surety bond.
3. a non-decreasing function of k.
First, the worse the¯nancial status of the¯rm, the higher the probability that the surety company will have to intervene (either by paying the full surety bond to the sponsor, or by helping the¯rm to¯nish the project). This implies that the surety company requires a higher interest rate from a¯rm with a worse¯nancial status in order to compensate for the opportunity costs of the surety bond. Second, the bigger the surety bond L, the higher the cost of the surety bond for the¯rms and therefore the higher the¯rms' bid. A higher bid reduces the likelihood that the surety company has to pay the full surety bond, which implies that the interest rate decreases in the size of the surety bond. 17 Finally, a higher k means that the underlying uncertainty of the project increases. This makes¯rms in a bad¯nancial situation bid more aggressively since a very low cost increases their expected pro¯ts, while very high costs leave them indi®erent. Therefore, the surety company needs to set a higher interest rate when k is higher, both to induce¯rms to bid less aggressively and because the¯rm is going to pay less often the full fee of the surety bond.
Next, we characterize how the bid varies with the¯nancial status of the¯rms.
Lemma 3 With a surety bond of size L we get the following equilibrium bid functions:
1. For L < k 1+r0 we get:
For L¸k 1+r 0 we get:
Notice that for L = 0 the bid function coincides with the bid function of lemma 1. When L goes to k 1+r0 from below, the bid function of case 1 converges to the bid function of case 2.
Given lemma 3, we di®erentiate these two cases to proceed with the analysis. First we study the case in which L < k 1+r0 .
Corollary 3 If the sponsor asks for a surety bond of size L < k 1+r 0 , 1. the function P ¤ (A i ) is a continuous function that reaches its minimum in A i = 0. When the¯nancial status of the¯rm A i lies in the interval (k ¡ (1 + r 0 )L; k) the project is always¯nished either by the¯rm alone or with the help of the surety, which implies that the bond L is never paid to the sponsor. Notice also that in this interval the bid is the same as that of the completely solvent¯rm with A i¸k . To understand this result think of the¯rm and the surety as a coalition; the cash-°ow accruing to this coalition is always the same for the range of A i¸k ¡ (1 + r 0 )L (since the bond is never paid to the sponsor). The di®erence between¯rms with A i 2 (k ¡ (1 +r 0 )L; k) and¯rms with A i¸k is that in the latter group the surety never has to pay any money, whereas in the former the surety sometimes has to help the¯rm to¯nish the project. This is compensated by the fact that¯rms with A i 2 (k ¡ (1 + r 0 )L; k) pay a higher fee to the surety.
the project is always¯nished if and only if the¯nancial status of the winning¯rm is
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aggressively than a solvent¯rm. These¯rms might be unable to complete the project if they win the auction. For a su±ciently bad shock, the surety prefers to pay L to the sponsor instead of helping such a¯rm to¯nish the project. If there are N¯rms, the probability that the winninḡ rm lies in this \bankruptcy" interval is de¯ned by
where F (¢) is the distribution function of¯rms. Clearly, the probability that the winning¯rm lies in the bankruptcy interval increases with the number of¯rms N, with the support of the shock k and decreases in the size of the surety bond L. Compared to the situation without a surety bond (L = 0), the problem of abnormally low tenders is mitigated, but not eliminated. Now we will
show that a large enough surety bond L¸k 1+r0 can eliminate completely the risk of bankruptcy for the sponsor and consequently the problem of abnormally low tenders.
Corollary 4 If the sponsor asks for a surety bond of size L¸k 1+r 0 , 1. the function P ¤ (A i ) becomes a continuous and non-increasing function.
2. any¯rm with A i¸0 will always¯nish the project. This bid function is illustrated in Figure 3 . From Figure 3 it is easy to see that¯rms with negative assets now bid less aggressively than¯rms with positive assets. Since the equilibrium bid for all¯rms with A i¸0 is the same (for the same (analogous) reason as the equilibrium bid for all¯rms with A i¸k ¡ (1 + r 0 )L was the same in Corollary 3), every¯rm with positive assets has the same probability to win the auction. Firms with A i 2 [0; k) have to pay a higher fee for their surety bond than solvent¯rms, and might need the surety's help to¯nish the project. The project will always be¯nished, but the¯rm might end up with ¦ i = 0. Firms with A i < 0 will never win the auction.
To summarize, when the size of the surety bond is larger than or equal to k 1+r0 the project is always¯nished by the¯rm or the surety, the bid function becomes non-increasing in the¯nancial assets of the¯rms, and therefore the problem of abnormally low tenders disappear. Notice that this important cut-o® point increases with k and decreases with r 0 . The intuitions are clear. On the one hand, increasing k increases the incentives of¯rms to gamble for resurrection, hence¯rms bid more aggressively, which implies that a larger L is required to eliminate the bankruptcy risk.
On the other hand, a higher r 0 implies that the fee paid by the¯rm for the surety bond will be larger. This increases the bid (price) and consequently reduces the risk of bankruptcy.
Proposition 2 summarizes the main results of this section and derives a necessary condition for the optimality of a surety bond.
Proposition 2 Requiring a surety bond reduces the problem of abnormally low tenders. If L < k 1+r0 the problem is mitigated but not eliminated, and if L¸k 1+r0 the problem of ALTs disappears.
As a consequence, the optimal size of the surety bond L ¤ is never larger than k 1+r0 .
Notice that for any L¸k 1+r0 the project is always¯nished whatever¯rm has won the auction, since we assumed there exists at least one¯rm with non-negative assets. Setting a size of the surety bond strictly larger than k 1+r 0 only increases the bid price. Hence it will never be optimal to set L > k 1+r 0 . In the next section we show that this is precisely what happens in the United
States.
The US practice
In the US public construction projects that exceed $100:000 are regulated by the Miller's Act.
The Miller's Act requires that the¯rm which is awarded the project purchases a performance bond. The required performance bond (which guarantees the quality and completion time of the project) is usually 100% of the contract price. 18
Now we assess this requirement in our model, by assuming that the sponsor requests the winning¯rm to post a surety bond equal to its bid price, that is, it requests L = P ¤ . Plugging L = P ¤ into equations (2) and (3) we obtain the following results:
Lemma 4 If L = P ¤ , the equilibrium bid function becomes a continuous and non-increasing
It is easy to see that the shape of this bid function is very similar to the one in lemma 3 with L¸k 1+r 0 . This seems to indicate that the problem of ALTs disappears when L = P ¤ . Proposition 3 formalizes this intuition.
Proposition 3 Requiring a surety bond equal to the contract price (i.e., L = P ¤ ), 1. eliminates all risk for the sponsor, since the project will always be completed.
2. provides overinsurance to the sponsor because the surety bond is larger than the smallest surety bond that eliminates all risk of bankruptcy.
3. has the following e®ects on the size of the surety bond: it increases in the expected cost of the project c, decrease in the risk-less interest rate r 0 and is independent of the uncertainty of the project k.
The above result shows that if surety bonds cover the entire contract price then the project is always¯nished. This is because L = P ¤ (A i ) = c 1¡r0 > k 1+ro , and we know from section 3.1 that this is the smallest surety bond required to eliminate the risks (and the costs) associated with bankruptcy for the sponsor. However, requiring L = P ¤ is excessive since a smaller surety bond would also eliminate the risk of bankruptcy for the sponsor at a lower procurement price. In the light of this result it seems that the US practice that covers more than the contract price is by far too expensive and obviously not optimal no matter what the size of the costs C B resulting from bankruptcy. Interestingly, European Insurance Companies recommend a possible European surety bond system in which the performance bond only covers 25% to 30% of the contractual value. 19
The driving force behind this result is that when L = P ¤ the size of the surety bond is linked to the expected cost of the project, but not to the underlying uncertainty of the project parametrized by k in our model. This implies overinsurance given our assumption that c > k: 20
Another implication of the link between the size of the surety bond and the expected cost is that two projects with the same expected cost but with di®erent underlying uncertainty will be covered by surety bonds of the same size. However, in section 3.1 we have shown that the minimal surety bond that ensures that the project will be completed depends positively on the project's 19 See the report on the "Prevention, Detection and Elimination of Abnormally Low Tenders in the European Construction Industry" elaborated by DGIII Working Group on Abnormally Low Tenders in 1999.
20 When we consider symmetric distributions of cost, assuming c is larger than the support of the distribution of the shock is the only sensible assumption, since otherwise for some realization of the shock total costs might turn out to be negative. However, we can think of asymmetric distribution of shocks in which c is smaller than the upper bound of the support of the distribution of the shock. In this case, we should take the result of point (2) in proposition 3 with precaution.
uncertainty. Therefore, it seems that the project with higher uncertainty should be covered by a larger surety bond since the incentives for gambling for resurrection are larger the higher the underlying uncertainty.
Finally, when L = P ¤ , the size of the surety bond depends positively on the riskless interest rate, which is one of the main factor determining the cost of the surety bond. When the riskless interest rate increases the bid price increases and consequently the surety bond also increases. In contrast, in section 3.1 we show that the minimal surety bond that ensures that the project will be completed is decreasing in the riskless interest rate; a higher interest rate increases the bid price and thereby reduces the risk of bankruptcy, which can now be eliminated by a smaller surety bond. Therefore, it seems that requiring L = P ¤ is a practice that does not react to changes in the riskless interest rate according to the optimal balance between the risk of bankruptcy and the cost of surety bonds.
Some further regulatory measures
Surety bonds are used in the US, Canada and Japan, but are not common e.g. in Europe. In this section we brie°y discuss other practical attempts to deal with the problem of abnormally low tenders.
Letters of credits
It is sometimes suggested that letters of credits could serve a similar purpose than surety bonds. After all, both systems guarantee that the sponsor will receive at least a certain amount of money, L, should bankruptcy occur. However, letters of credits di®er fundamentally from surety bonds in their nature and in the incentives they provide. To issue a letter of credit banks require from the constructor to pledge speci¯c assets; these assets are paid to the sponsor should the letter, which is not tied to the underlying contract, be called. Hence, banks take no risk at all and therefore have no incentive to screen¯rms, whose liquidity is reduced since some of their assets are frozen to back up the letter of credit. In contrast, surety bonds do not alter¯rms' assets; some risk is shifted to the surety company who helps the¯rm to¯nish the project should this require less resources from the surety than the payment of the surety bond. Surety companies therefore heavily screen¯rms before issuing the bond. Given these major di®erences, it is not surprising that letters of credits cannot serve the same purpose than surety bonds. While letters of credits exclude¯rms with¯nancial status A i < L from participating in the auction, they aggravate the danger of bankruptcy of participating¯rms.
To see this point notice that with no policy intervention any¯rm with A i¸k is solvent in the sense that it will never go bankrupt (Corollary 1). With letters of credits only \supersolvent" rms with A i¸k + L (who only have access to A i ¡ L of their assets during the construction process since the amount L is frozen) are immune to bankruptcy. By worsening their¯nancial situation letters of credits convert some good¯rms, namely A i 2 (k; k +L), into insolvent¯rms. 21
Detection by deviations from average price
A common system to face the problem of abnormally low tenders is to exclude those tenders from the procurement process whose bids di®er by more than a certain percentage (e.g.10% or 15%) from the average of tender bids or from the second lowest bid. 22 However, an endogenous threshold cannot be an e®ective screening device, since insolvent¯rms can always increase their bids to mimic the behavior of¯rms in a good¯nancial status. This strategic reaction of¯rms to the endogenous threshold is very likely to result in the inexistence of pure strategy equilibria in which those¯rms with a bad¯nancial status are excluded from winning the auction. 23 Consequently, the endogenous threshold can only have a bite, if¯rms use mixed strategies. But in this case anȳ rm might be excluded no matter what its¯nancial situation is. In fact, the report elaborated by a working group on the Prevention, Detection and Elimination of Abnormally Low Tenders in the European Construction Industry points out that there is no information at all concerning the e±ciency of this system. Another weak point of using an endogenous threshold is that it might induce collusion among the¯rms. One way in which a cartel can avoid competition is by increasing their bids by common agreement in order to disqualify non cartel members as abnormally low bidders. Since collusion is costly for the sponsor, any device that facilitates collusion should be avoided.
Conclusion
Some public managers point out that it is very risky to use auctions in public procurement, especially for small or medium-sized projects where the market of potential contractors is very big and little is known about individual¯rms. They claim that the winner of the auction can be ā rm with a high probability of bankruptcy. In this paper we show that this fear is realistic. Sincē rms are protected by limited liability when they declare bankruptcy, some¯rms in a bad¯nancial situation or with an important need for cash°ow have little to loose but a lot to win and therefore bid very aggressively in the procurement process. Therefore, it is likely that the winning¯rm is a¯rm in¯nancial di±culties. This problem which is known as abnormally low tenders makes it necessary to modify the selection mechanism. In this paper we study some existing regulatory measures to face the problem of abnormally low tenders. We are especially interested in surety bonds which seem to be the most e®ective system used. Our model shows that surety bonds as used in the US are indeed e®ective. However, the American solution provides overinsurance to the problem of abnormally low tenders and is by far too expensive. The American solution links the size of the surety bond to the expected cost of the project and not to the underlying uncertainty as is required by the optimal surety bond. A modi¯cation of the current system in which the level of insurance provided by the surety bond is based on estimates of the underlying uncertainty may save costs while keeping the same level of protection.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
ds;
with ¹ k = P ¤ ¡ c + A i : Notice that for s > ¹ k, P ¤ ¡ c ¡ s + A i < 0 and the¯rm is not going tō nish the project: it closes down to avoid losses.
The equilibrium bid is determined by ¦
(ii) For 0 A i k:
(iii) If A i > k it is easy to see that P ¤ = c.
Proof of Corollary 1
Immediate from the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Given the bid function it is immediate to see that when there is some¯rm with A i 2 (¡k; k); the winning¯rm will not be a solvent¯rm. Now we prove that the sponsor would be better o® by awarding the project to a solvent¯rm (which exists by assumption) at its bid price c.
If the winning¯rm is solvent A i¸k there is no bankruptcy risk; the sponsor's utility is
If the winning¯rm is not solvent, we have to distinguish two cases:
i) First, we analyze the case in which the¯nancial value of the winning¯rm lies between 0 and k, i.e., 0 A i < k. In this case the sponsor's utility is
Rewriting the above expression we get
ds. To prove that the sponsor's utility is lower in this case than if the project is awarded to a solvent¯rm it is su±cient to show that ª¸0: Deriving ª with respect to the procurement price P , we obtain
Therefore ª reaches its minimum for P = c ¡ k ¡ A i + p 4kA i . We will now show that ª = 0
Notice that P = c ¡ k ¡ A i + p 4kA i is the equilibrium bid P ¤ of the¯rm with¯nancial value A i . From the proof of lemma 1 we know that this bid is implicitly de¯ned by the following equation
With some algebra we can see that this equation implies ª = 0:
(ii) For the case in which the winning¯rm has¯nancial value A i < 0, the proof is exactly analogous to the¯rst case (i), so it is left to the reader.
Proof of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
In this proof we will use equations (2) and (3) to characterize the equilibrium bids and the surety fees.
1. Let A i < 0. By equation (2) and using similar arguments as in the proof of lemma 1 thē rm will bid
By equation (3) the surety company's problem is to choose r such that Ef¦ S (P ¤ i ; L; r i )g = r o L. Notice that the surety will pay the money necessary to¯nish the project (c+s¡P ¤ ¡A i ) as long as it is less than paying the bond of size L. That is, as long as
Notice that this condition is satis¯ed for s ¹ k´¡k + (1 +r)L. Hence, the surety company chooses r such that
Hence, for s > ¹ k, the¯rm will go bankrupt and the surety company compensates the sponsor for the size of the surety bond L. For s < ¹ k the project will be¯nished and the surety company con¯scates the pro¯ts of the¯rm.
(a) If ¹ k = ¡k+(1+r)L > k, i.e. L(1+r) > 2k, then the surety company's problem becomes
Hence the condition L(1 + r) > 2k becomes L > k 1+r 0 :
(b) If L < k 1+r0 the surety company's problem is to set r such that Z +k
This can be rewritten as:
which is equivalent to (using (4))
2. Let A i > 0. We use equation (2) to determine P ¤ :
The surety company's problem in this case is:
where ¹ k = P ¤ ¡c +A i ¡rL and k 0 = P ¤ ¡c +A i +L. For s < ¹ k, the project is completed and the surety receives the surety fees from the¯rm. For ¹ k < s < k 0 , the project is completed but the¯rm is unable to pay the surety fee. The surety either has to help the¯rm to¯nish the project or con¯scates the pro¯ts of the¯rm leaving the¯rm with A i = 0. If s > k 0 , the project will not be¯nished and the surety company looses the bond. We can reformulate
(a) Using (6) it is easy to see that A i > k implies ¹ k > k: In this case the surety company's problem becomes: R k ¡k rL ds 2k = r o L ) r = r o and P ¤ = c + r 0 L (b) If k > A i > 0 we have to distinguish two cases:
i. If k 0 > k the surety company's problem is:
Using (6) and (5) we can derive:
Given (8), the condition k 0 > k becomes
ii. If k 0 < k; the surety company's problem is:
Solving the integrals and using (6), (7) and (5) we obtain: 
We rewrite the expressions of r(A i ; L): For L < k 1+r0 : 
Now, it is immediate to see that r(A i ; L) is decreasing in L:
3. Immediate from calculating the derivative. For L < k 1+r 0 : @r(Ai;L) @k = 8 > > > > > < > > > > > : 
2. Immediate from the proofs of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 2
Immediate.
Proof of Lemma 4
We are going to use the bid functions provided by lemma 3. We will show that we always are in the case L = P ¤ > k 1+r0 .
(i) For A i < 0, we have L = P ¤ > k 1+r 0 always. To see this point assume that this is indeed the case. Then P ¤ (A i ) = c¡A i 1¡r 0 > k 1+r 0 . On the other hand assume that P ¤ < k 1+r 0 : Then P ¤ = c¡k¡A i +2 p (1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡P ¤ . Hence P ¤ solves the equation c¡k¡A i +2( p (1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡P ¤ ) = 0.
A i < 0 implies c ¡ k ¡ A i > 0: Hence p (1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡ P ¤ < 0. p (1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡ P ¤ is a concave function that equals 0 when P ¤ = 0 and when P ¤ = (1 + r 0 )k. Therefore this function is only negative for P ¤ > (1 + r 0 )k. But this contradicts our assumption that P ¤ < k 1+r0 :
(ii) For A i > 0;¯rst assume that A i > k ¡ (1 + r 0 )L. Thus P ¤ = c 1¡r0 and A i > k ¡
(1 + r 0 )c 1 ¡ r 0 :
Now, c > k implies that k ¡ (1+r 0 )c 1¡r0 < 0. Thus A i > k ¡ (1+r 0 )c 1¡r0 is always satis¯ed for A i > 0.
On the other hand, assume that A i < k ¡ (1 + r 0 )L = k ¡ (1 + r 0 )P ¤ . This implies that P ¤ < k¡A i 1+r 0 . P ¤ is de¯ned by the equation c ¡ k ¡ A i + 2( p kA i + (1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡ P ¤ ) = 0. Notice that p 4kA i + 4(1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡ 2P ¤ is a concave function.
1. if c ¡ k > A i , then p kA i + (1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡ P ¤ has to be negative, which is the case for P ¤ > e P = (1 + r o )k + p (1 + r o ) 2 k 2 + 4kA i 2 But e P > k¡A i 1+r 0 which contradicts the requirement that P ¤ < k¡A i 1+r 0 .
To see that e P > k¡A i 1+r0 , notice that e P > (1 + r o )k (which is e P at A i = 0).
2. if c ¡ k < A i < k, then p kA i + (1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡ P ¤ has to be positive, which is the case for P ¤ < e P. But also P ¤ < k¡Ai 1+r0 which is smaller than e P (as shown above) and therefore the relevant constraint. We will calculate the optimal bid and show that it violates this relevant constraint. P ¤ solves c ¡ k ¡ A i + 2( p kA i + (1 + r 0 )kP ¤ ¡ P ¤ ) = 0 which leads to
The negative root can be eliminated since ¡(c ¡ k ¡ A i ) 2 + 4kA i > 0. To see this point notice that
We now have to show that P ¤ > k¡Ai 1+r0 . Hence we have to show that
We have already shown that ¡(c ¡ k ¡ A i ) 2 + 4kA i > 0. If we can show that 4(k¡A i ) 2 (1+r0) 2 ¡ 4(k¡A i )(c¡A i +r 0 k) 1+r 0 < 0 we are done. This is indeed the case.
4(k ¡
This establishes the optimal bid function as
